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THE LAW-MAKING FUNCTION OF THE JUDGE*
Albert Tate, Jr.**

Law students are no longer surprised by an admission that
our judges sometimes create law-rules as well as apply them.
Indeed, perhaps law schools overrate the influence of social
policy upon the decisional process. The settled rule governs
almost all the area of everyday law practice, and the vast millrun of litigation neither requires nor allows much free play of
judicial discretion. In the trial court only the rare case involves
the uncertain rule rather than the uncertain application of a
rule itself indisputable. Even in the appellate courts, which
decide the borderline litigation of many law practices and of
many trial courts, only a small minority1 of cases involve respectable discretion to select the decisive law-rule.
My remarks concern the law-making function of the appellate judge, but they must be viewed in this context. To single
out this limited judicial role must necessarily overemphasize
its quantitative importance. Nor at this late date can novelty
of theme enhance any discussion of rule-creation by judges.2
What, then, may justify yet another glance at this now familiar
text?
Over the past thirteen years of experience as a state appellate judge I have come to see that law-improvement functions
are an inescapable part of the duties of an appellate court.
Though they be minor quantitatively, these functions are quali* A

paper delivered April 22, 1967, at ceremonies inducting the writer

as an honorary member of the Order of the Coif at the Law School of
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
** Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, on leave
of absence to serve as Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law
School, 1967-68. The writer is indebted for research and editorial assistance
to A. Lynn Wright, II, law clerk to the Third Circuit 1966-67, member of
the Calcasieu and Orleans Bars.
1. Commencing with an estimate of CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
60 (1924), somewhat corroborated by similar estimates from other sources,
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS 25

(1960)

and

Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 256
(1961), the currently fashionable guess is that perhaps 10 percent of the
caseload of major appellate courts permit choice of the applicable lawrule in accordance with the social value of those rules permissibly applicable. Cf., e.g., Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer Newly Become Judge, 71
YALE L.J. 218, 222 (1961).
2. See, e.g., Symposium, The Changing Role of the Judiciary in the
Development of Law, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 761-955 (1961), as well as sources
cited in note 1 supra.
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tatively important, for they aid the law to keep alive and current and responsive to the changing needs of our society. The
subject of judicial creativity has become a sensitive subject
during these same years, when the national Supreme Court's
recent constitutional rulings, unpopular with many as to substantive result, have been attacked as unwarranted judicial legislation. My hope is that by discussion of the judicial lawchoosing role in its more humdrum day-to-day aspects-as it
affects a state appellate court disposing of its ever increasing
docket of mostly private disputes-we may note that law-creation
functions performed by appellate courts are not exercised in
derogation of the paramount law-making power vested in the
legislatures but rather as a necessary supplement to it.
Let me at the outset repeat the usual disclaimers. The proper
function of the courts is to adjudicate, not to legislate; the legislature is and must be the ultimate and paramount source of
law. Inevitably, however, the adjudicative process in American
jurisdictions requires that on occasion the courts create or modify a general rule in order to decide a dispute pending before
the courts. Indeed, historically, our Constitution and customs envisage that the courts will perform law revision and law adaptation functions in order to maintain the coherency and currency
of the law. Nevertheless, in the small proportior of cases in
which judicial law-creation is appropriate, such power must be
exercised subject to traditional restraints and more to accord
with the reasoned development of pre-existing doctrine than to
express any personal philosophy of the judges.
In further preliminary, we will limit the ambit of our discussion. We will not now consider the various philosophical
concepts which divide legal philosophers. We will instead accept
as our present working definition that the law is simply the
rules of substance or procedure by which the courts decide
cases before them. 3 Thus, for present purposes we will assume
that law-rules formulated by judicial decisions represent judicial law-making, disregarding the civilian concept that judicial
decisions are only interpretations and that law results from
legislation alone. 4 Also, we will focus our view on private lawthe judicial law-making responsibility arising from the decision
3. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 84 (2d ed. 1921; Beacon
Press reprint, 1963).
4. See sources cited in Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in
Louisiana, 22 LA. L. Rv. 727 (1962).
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of disputes between private persons to settle private rights and
liabilities. By doing so, we will attempt to avoid the emotioncharged atmosphere surrounding the duty of the courts to decide
public-law questions of policy and constitutional interpretation.
Our concern will thus be with the courts' law-making function
in the development of the "lawyer's law" of the quiet law
libraries, not the "political law" of the bustling legislature or
of the strident street corners.
I
Before we generalize about judicial law-making, it may be
well to illustrate one of the aspects of the problem by a specific
example.
When I was a member of the old Louisiana First Circuit,
in 1957, we were faced in Alexander v. General Acc. Fire & Life
Assur. Corp.5 with an issue never before explicitly decided by
any previous Louisiana decision-the standard of care owed by
a host to a social guest injured through some defect of the
host's premises (in this case a carelessly attached runner-rug
in a dark hall). No statute of our legislature directly regulated
the matter. The only legislation applicable was our Civil Code's
general provision obliging those who cause damage through
"fault" to pay for it.6
Under the common law of England and the court-made law
of most American jurisdictions, a host generally owes to a social
guest only the duty to warn him of latent dangers the host
actually knows about. 7 This is to be contrasted with the care

required of the host for almost all other invitees, to whom his
duty includes an affirmative responsibility to warn of or to
correct latent defects which are reasonably discoverable-in
short, to take reasonable precautions against undue risk of
reasonably foreseeable harm, the usual duty owed in most areas
of negligence law. The courts of other states had applied this
common-law social-guest rule over a current of dissent. Some
tort scholars felt that the host should owe the guest in his home
the same duty not to injure him negligently through premise
defects as he admittedly owed to business callers-or for that
5. 98 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
6. LA. CivuL Cons art. 2315 (1870).
7. PROSSER, TORTS § 60, at 387-88 (3d ed. 1964); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598
(1952).
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matter, to the social guest himself for negligently inflicted injuries not caused by defective premises. 8
In 1957, then, this question of law, the duty of a host to a
social guest for premise defects, came before our court for
decision in the Alexander case. Even though there were no
Louisiana statutes or decisions to guide us, we as a court nevertheless had to decide the case. To do so, of course, we had to
select and apply some rule of law based upon no previous Louisiana authority and to set this forth in a reasoned opinion to
be published. We could not, for instance, withhold action indefinitely until the legislature might act on the question, if ever.
In this situation, should we, in selecting the law-rule to
apply, choose the old English common-law rule followed by
most American jurisdictions? If we did, should we do so without consideration of whether it was better than the ordinarycare rule preferred by many scholars, simply because most
other American courts had chosen the English rule to apply?
Or should we instead choose from the two law-rules that one
which we thought to be the fairer and more socially useful, the
more consistent with the general body of tort law and with
standards of behavior and social expectations in twentiethcentury America?
As my loaded questions suggest, our court did not select
the preponderant English-American social guest rule. We felt
that the rule recommended by some modern scholars to be the
better, and the one more consistent with the general body of
Louisiana law and the general social conditions of today. A few
years later, our State Supreme Court approved and applied the
social guest standard adopted in the Alexander case.9
But the story is not ended yet. A further development with
regard to our social-guest law-rule exemplifies that the scope
of judicial law-making is always subject to oversight and review
by the legislature.
Following our 1957 decision in Alexander, there was no
legislative reaction. However, in Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau
8. As in the cases of food furnished the guest or driving the guest to
and from the host's home. See authorities discussed and cited in Alexander
v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 98 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957); and in PROSSER, TORTS §§ 60, 61 (3d ed. 1964).
9. Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250 La. 847, 195 So.2d 6836 (1967). See
also Comment, 27 LA. L. Rsv. 796 (1967).
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Cas. Ins. Co.10 in 1962, the Louisiana Third Circuit, upon which
I was then sitting, held a host camp owner's liability insurer
liable to a social guest for a fall resulting from a defective condition of a fishing camp porch. It was indeed a close question;
an invitation to a hunting and fishing camp does not carry with
it the same assurance of the safety of the premises as could be
expected from an invitation to a home. Nevertheless, a majority
of our court felt that the hazard in question, producing a really
serious injury, was unreasonable in view of its concealment from
ordinary observation. We therefore affirmed recovery. In the
next regular session of the legislature, a statute was enacted to
provide that no owner or occupant of property was under any
duty to keep premises safe for use "by others for hunting, fishing, camping, hiking, sight-seeing, or boating," and also that
by any permission given to others "to enter the premises for
such recreational purposes he [the owner] does not thereby extend any assurance that the premises are safe . . .-', Thus, the
legislature overruled our social-guest law-rule insofar as it applied to non-commercial recreational premises.
We might well conclude from this prompt legislative reaction that, while the legislature disapproved of the Daire fishingcamp application of the Alexander rule, it did approve and
accept Alexander's general rule that a host owed ordinary care
to a social guest in usual circumstances. The legislative inactivity
following the 1957 Alexander decision, as contrasted with the
prompt legislative reaction to the 1962 Daire holding, lends
further support to this thesis.
These theoretical deductions are of course largely imaginary.
Although the deductions possess an element of general plausibility, the truth of the matter, almost certainly, is that few if
any of the 150 legislators serving in 1957 or at any of the subsequent sessions had heard of either the Alexander or the Daire
decisions. With the many other more important public questions
and the hundreds and hundreds of legislative bills and resolutions for them to consider and dispose of, the rather rare plight
of the injured social guest or of his host was simply not grave
enough to occupy much if any of the attention of any but a
few. The legislature's prompt reaction to Daire resulted from
a collision with the interests of hunting groups and the politically
10. 143 So.2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
11. LA. R.S. 9:2791 (Supp. 1966). The enactment excluded commercial
enterprises from those exempted from liability for premise defect.
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articulate farm bureau, who immediately secured legislative
revision, rather than from any programmed scanning of the
advance sheets by busy legislators to note judicial decisions
needing legislative correction. I do not say this in any demeaning
vein, for almost all legislation results from the push of interests
adversely affected by current conditions. 12 The observation is
made simply to keep in perspective the milieu within which
legislative oversight of appellate jurisprudence takes place.
Simultaneously, we do emphasize that the legislature through
its policy deciding primacy may simply overrule the rare case
where a judicially created rule or its application is sufficiently
displeasing or important to warrant legislative attention.
II
Let us now consider more closely the function of our court
in selecting the law-rule to apply in Alexander.
As an appellate court, our role was to decide this pending
litigation by a written reasoned opinion. We need now do no
more than note briefly the function of the reasoned opinion to
assure that legal disputes of similarly situated interests are decided in accordance with consistent principles. But the requirement of a reasoned opinion had as its consequence that our court
in Alexander could not simply decide for the plaintiff or for the
defendant without stating the legal reasons for the result. Our
duty thus required us to formulate a law-rule for the result we
reached, even though no previous Louisiana case and no Louisiana statute provided us with one for mechanical application.
Consider further the resultant implication that, as with all
appellate opinions in Louisiana, our eventual decision and our
reasoning in Alexander would be published in the Southern
Reporter. Of course, this must be to guide litigants and the trial
courts within the reviewing jurisdiction that the same appellate court will ordinarily decide a similar question similarly
should it be brought before that court in the future. Based upon
this expectation, lawyers will advise clients in the regulation
of their affairs and in the disposition of unlitigated disputes.
Based upon it, trial courts will decide them. The bulk of these
trial decisions will not result in any appeal; in the event of
appeal, it is most probable that the same appellate court will
12. See, e.g., Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. RPv. 749 (1965).
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not see fit to re-examine and change the law-rule created by
its own precedent.
I mention these obvious circumstances to emphasize again
what all lawyers know and what few laymen can deny: That
the ordinary and customary operation of our judicial process
requires the courts on occasion to create law-rules where needed
to decide the case, and that these law-rules operate with prospective effect to regulate the clashes of similar interests in the
future, in much the same manner (although more limited in
scope) as does a new statute.
In choosing or creating the law-rule to apply, few, it seems
to me, will suggest that the choice or creation should be exercised by logic or deduction or jurisdiction-counting alone. I suppose almost all will agree that, where the judge is given discretion to select or devise the law-rule to apply, the rule's practical
wisdom, general fairness, and future usefulness to society are
considerations which should influence the judge, 18 albeit the
judge's discretion is circumscribed by the usual necessity that
the new rule be an extension generally consistent with preexisting legal doctrine, as well as by traditional limitations upon
the judiciary's exercise of its historic law-making powers.
In Louisiana, our Civil Code specifically authorizes the
courts to do so. Article 2114 provides: "In all civil matters,
where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed
and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal
is made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where
positive law is silent." To the same effect, but perhaps more
explicit, is a provision of the Swiss Civil Code: "The statute
governs all the matters within the letter or spirit of any of its
provisions. In the absence of any applicable statutory provisions,
the judge shall decide according to customary law, and in its
absence according to rules he would enact as a legislator. In
this he shall follow the established doctrine and decisional law."'15
Even without such legislative mandate, I suggest, courts do or
should follow this approach in devising the law-rule by which
to decide the unprovided-for case.
13. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-41 (1921); GANY,
METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE INSTITUTE) (1963), summarized and reviewed in Tate, Book Review, 25 LA. L. REV. 577 (1956).
14. LA. CIVIL CODE (1870).
15. SWISS CIVIL CODE art. 1 (1907).
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III
Judicial creation of a law-rule is obviously necessary to
decide a question not provided for by legislation. Closely akin
to this situation, but much more common, is the duty thrust
upon the courts by the volume of new legislation to synthesize
it within the body of pre-existing law.
Where legislation represents a fully integrated and comprehensive scheme of regulation, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, the courts cannot and should not weigh policy
considerations or use creative interpretation in the application
of the statutory command. But much legislation is piecemeal,
sometimes hastily or inadvertently drafted, often without consideration of competing or overlapping or inconsistent enactments. In these instances, the courts must perform, and the
legislature intends for them to do so, the function of integrating
the interpretation of the statute into the general body of the
law, or coordinating its principle with others applicable, and of
limiting the statute or extending it according to its intended
purpose (for the literal words often permit either broad or
narrow applications, the circumference of the statute not being
discernible from the words themselves). 1 The courts are thus
contemplated as a complementary law-making institute to rationalize isolated statutes in accord with their intended purpose
and to permit them to serve as reasoned principle within a
coherent and intelligible framework of general law.
An example given by one observer is the married women's
emancipation acts of many jurisdictions.1 7 Although usually the
statute itself merely granted married women the right to sue
and be sued and to own and convey property, the incidental
results of this change of status forced the courts to reconsider
and redetermine the tort liability of the spouses to each other
as well as to third persons for the other spouse's torts, as well
as other law-rules in other areas of law not ostensibly affected
by the sparse terms of the emancipation act itself.
16. See Breitel, The Courts and Law Making, in LEaAL INSTITUTIONS
TODAY AND TOMORROW 1 (Paulsen ed. 1959); Professor Hart's "comment" on
the Breitel paper, id. at 40-48; Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the
Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414 (1961).
17. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD ESSAYS 223-24

(1934). Dean Landis' other illustrations concern general law changes resulting from specific enactment relating to inheritance-by-illegitimates, wrongful deaths, and trade union statutes.
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A recent Louisiana example leaps to mind. In 1960, the legislature revised Article 2103 of our Civil Code.18 The specific intent
solely expressed by the Louisiana State Law Institute recommendation with the 1960 amendment was "to provide a substantive law base for the enforcement of contribution among
joint tortfeasors" and to overrule prior jurisprudence to the
contrary. 19
In the application of the new statute a host of issues arose
for which the statutory provisions furnished no guide. Some of
them involved a conflict between the new statute and principles
established by prior legislation not necessarily intended to be
affected by the new statute. For instance, by a former statutory
provision interspousal immunity is established, so that neither
spouse can sue the other. Did the new contribution statute
permit, in a wife's suit against a tortfeasor, such defendant to
demand contribution from the husband (on the ground that the
wife's injuries were produced by the husband's contributing
fault as a joint tortfeasor), thus permitting the wife to recover
indirectly from her husband what she was directly prohibited
by the earlier statute from recovering? 20 Again, a statutory provision of the workmen's compensation statute exempts an employer from non-compensation (e.g., tort) liability to an employee injured in an employment accident. Does it likewise
still apply so as to exempt the employer when he is called upon,
under the provisions of the new statute, as a joint tortfeasor
solidarily bound to contribute to recovery against another tortfeasor liable to his workman's survivors in tort. 21 Or, if one
tortfeasor attempts to implead another party as joint tortfeasor
by third-party demand as authorized by the new statute, can
that third-party defendant plead a release between it and the
plaintiff as freeing it from the obligation of contribution, thus
relying upon prior statutes providing, as between claimant and
codebtor, for the claimant's obligation to deduct the part formerly owed by a released codebtor (and does this "part" refer
to the monetary amount or to the fractional proportion) ?22
18. La. Acts 1960, No. 30.
19. La. Civil Code Ann. art. 2103, reporter's note at 85 (West Supp. 1966).
See also Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 22 LA. L. REV.
818 (1962) and Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortleasors: Louisianava
Past, Present and Future, 37 TUL. L. REV. 525 (1963).
20. Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So.2d
122 (1965), reversing 164 So.2d 647 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
21. Hebert v. Blankenship, 187 So.2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
22. Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So.2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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Again, with regard to suits instituted prior to the effective date
of the new contribution statute, are the rights created by the
24
28
new statute substantive or procedural, or is this material,
with regard to the retroactivity or not in application of the new
statute?
I sat as a member of the court called upon to decide these
sometimes complex questions arising from the collision of the
concepts of the new statute with those provided by former
legislation. If the new enactment had clearly been intended to
govern, of course there was no problem-we were simply to
apply the later legislation. However, there was no legislative
indication that the new statute should supersede the earlier
legislative principles not directly within its scope. We would
abdicate the judicial function by simply applying the later legislation on some mechanical rule that the latest enactment must
always supersede all earlier statutes even arguably affected,
without attaching any relevance to whether this later enactment was really intended to apply.
And I should at this point state that the legislative "intent"
or its absence was in the instances noted largely imaginaryfor (and we were fortunate to have a Law Institute recommendation specifically ascribing legislative purpose, unlike for the
bulk of legislation) it was quite obvious that, in furnishing the
new principle that one joint tortfeasor is allowed a substantive
base to enforce contribution from another, the legislature had
not remotely contemplated the surrounding questions which
arose when the new principle was to be introduced into the
context of pre-existing law. In such instances, the legislature
must expect the courts to formulate the synthesizing rules, by
which the new legislative principle will, in coordination and
harmony with prior laws, serve socially useful aims consistent
so far as possible with related legal doctrine. In so doing, it is
the courts which will make the policy-determinations as to which
of the legislative principles shall be accorded priority, and it
is the' courts which must create from the competing statutes that
new law-rule which will synthesize what in the court's judgment is the wisest rule to apply in the penumbra area created
by the overlapping of the statutory principles.
23. Brown v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 So.2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961), cert. granted.
24. Brown v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 243 La. 271, 142 So.2d 796 (1962),
reversing 136 So.2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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Many observers believe that additionally, as a constitutionally contemplated judicial responsibility, the courts must
more general and more pervaexercise a law-revision function 25
sive than those so far illustrated.
In his classic work, The Nature of the Judicial Process,
Cardozo quoted Professor Arthur Corbin, a distinguished scholar,
as follows: "It is the function of courts to keep the doctrines
up to date with the mores by continual restatement and by
giving them a continually new content. This is judicial legislation, and the judge legislates at his peril. Nevertheless, it is
the necessity and duty of such legislation that gives a judicial
office its highest honor; and 26no brave and honest judge shirks
the duty or fears the peril.
Cardozo continued: "You may say that there is no assurance
that judges will interpret the mores of their day more wisely
and truly than other men. I am not disposed to deny this, but
in my view it is quite beside the point. The point is rather that
this power of interpretation must be lodged somewhere, and the
custom of the constitution has lodged it in the judges. If they
are to fulfill their function as judges, it could hardly be lodged
elsewhere. The recognition of this power and duty to shape the
law in conformity with the customary morality is something
far removed from the destruction of all rules and substitution
in every instance of the individual sense of justice . .

.

. The

form and structure of the organism are fixed. The cells in which
there is motion do not change the proportions of the mass.
Insignificant is the power of innovation of any judge, when
compared with the bulk and pressure of the rules that hedge
him on every side. Innovate, however, to some extent, he must,
for with new conditions there must be new rules.""
Especially in the area of private law, over the decades the
legislatures have been content for the courts to perform their
traditional judicial function to modify and revise law concepts
25. See, e.g., Breitel, The Courts and Law Mak~ing, in LnoAL INmwruToNs
TODAY AND TOMORROW 1 (Paulsen ed. 1959); Keeton, Judicial Law Reform-

A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 TEXAS L. REv.
1254 (1966); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy (1956), reprinted in 34 U. Cm.
L. REv. 3 (1966).
26. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 135 (1921), quoting from
29 YALE L.J. 771 (1920).
27. Id. 135-37.
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and applications to suit the changing conditions of newer times.
The legislature could not, practically, perform such a function
itself, with its limited time and facilities. Indeed, some observers
have pointed out that legislation is often a later attempt to
generalize the regulation of social disputes which had first
emerged in litigation initially decided by courts alone-that
legislation is as much a reaction to judicial decision, as judicial
decisions are to legislation, with the courts often providing the
first initiative toward principled regulation of a social situation
through piecemeal case-by-case improvisation resolving the early
varied facets of the emerging problems. 28 Of course, as the
legislative treatment of our Third Circuit decision in Daire illustrates, judicial law-making is subject to veto or modification by
the legislature. The legislature's primacy in law-making must
always be recognized, even though the courts do perform important subsidiary and complementary law-making duties.
V
Perhaps a detailed case-study of this general law-revision
function in operation may illustrate that it is not usurpatory of
the legislature's power but rather supplementary to it and a
necessary consequence of the judicial function in contemporary
America.
Of the many examples of continuous judicial revision to
keep the law useful and fair as applied to current conditions, to
me one of the most illustrative for Louisiana is the treatment
by our State Supreme Court of the "assured clear distance"
rule.2 In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Saia,80 that court in
1937 affirmed the dismissal of a suit which alleged that the
plaintiff's truck had run into an unlighted truck and trailer
parked on the public highway on a dark night. The court held
28. Gellhorn, The Legislative and the Administrative Response, 17 VAND.
L. Rsv. 91, 96-97 (1963); Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD EssAYs 213, at 230 (1934).

29. The Work of the Loufsiana Supreme Court for the 1958-59 TermTorts, 19 LA. L. REv. 338 (1959); for the 1956-57 Term, 18 LA. L. REv. 68
(1957); for the 1958-54 Term, 17 LA. L. REv. 345 (1957). In these commentaries,

Professor Malone suggests that we should frankly realize that the old
"assured clear distance" rule has been modified to reflect modern conditions,
so that "'the duty could not be appropriately described as one merely obliging the driver to maintain such control and speed as will enable him to
bring his car to a reasonable stop if faced with a sudden obstruction in his
path of travel.'"
30. 188 La. 358, 177 So. 238 (1937).
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that at night "the driver of an automobile is guilty of negligence
in driving at a rate of speed greater than that in which he could
stop within the range of his vision." 31 The only statute relied
upon by the court was the provision requiring that every
vehicle operated on the public highways after dark be equipped
with headlights sufficient to render clearly discernible any
person on the highway for a distance of 200 feet ahead.8 2 The
court felt that the plaintiff's negligence was not excused by the
defendant's failure to comply with another statutory provision
prohibiting the parking of an obstructing vehicle on the highway after dark without appropriate signal lights. 88
Nevertheless, just twelve years later, in Dodge v. Bituminous Cas. Corp.,34 the same court found an oncoming night
motorist free of negligence when he did not see the defendant's
unlighted parked truck until he was too close to avoid colliding
with it, because his visibility ahead was disturbed by the burning lights of oncoming traffic. Without referring to the statutory
headlight-provision relied upon in Saia, the court simply stated
that the parking of the defendant's truck on the highway, without lights or signals in violation of the statutory provision
brushed aside by Saia, was "the proximate cause of the collision." 35 As the court's summary in the opinion of statutory history illustrates, there had been no intervening change in the
substance of the statutory regulation since the Saia decision.86
The majority opinion stated, incidentally, that in the absence of
express statute "the court may adopt theoretical standards from
common sense experience for the insuring of the safety of the
road. '8 7 A dissent in Dodge noted that the holding was at variance with the court's 1937 decision in Saia, which was neither
discussed nor even cited in Dodge's majority opinion. The dissent also pointed out that there were no exceptional circumstances as in Gaiennie v. Cooperative Prod. Co.,88 which ten
years earlier had established an exception to the harsh application of the "assured clear distance" rule enunciated by Saia.
31. Id. at 361, 177 So. at 239.
32. La. Acts 1932, No. 21, § 9(g)(1), (12). These are the predecessor provisions of those enacted by La. Acts 1962, No. 310.
33. La. Acts 1932, No. 21, § 3(rule 15). The equivalent provision is now
found In LA. R.S. 32-141 (1950), as reenacted by La. Acts 1932, No. 310.
34. 214 La. 1031, 39 So.2d 720 (1949).
35. Id. at 1039, 39 So.2d at 723.
36. Id. at 1038, 39 So.2d at 722-23.
37. Id. at 1038, 39 So.2d at 723.
38. 196 La. 417, 199 So. 377 (1940).
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And so it continued, with the most recent expressions of
our Supreme Court holding flatly that "a motorist traveling by
night is not charged with the duty of guarding against striking
an unexpected or unusual obstruction, which he had no reason
to anticipate he would encounter on the highway."3 9 For this
reason, these Supreme Court opinions and numerous intermediate court opinions 40 have held night motorists who run into
obstructing vehicles parked unlighted upon the highway to be
free of contributory negligence, despite the night motorists'
failure to slow when their powers of perception are disturbed
by the lights of oncoming traffic.
With regard to the two most recent opinions of the Supreme
Court, Suire v. Winters (1957)41 and Vowell v. Manufacturers

Cas. Ins. Co. (1956) ,42 no change of substance in the statutory
provisions in effect at the time of the Saia decision in 1937 had
taken place in the interval. 43 What has changed are the context
social conditions, especially the conditions of travel at night.
With better highways and with better vehicles, it became safe
to drive at higher speeds. It became more dangerous to obstruct
normal night traffic by darkened obstacles. For instance, while
earlier statutes of 187044 and 191441 had provided nominal mis-

demeanor penalties for blocking a road, our Criminal Code of
1942 provided for imprisonment of up to 15 years for the intentional obstruction of a highway foreseeably endangering
human life.46 Thus, under more modern conditions, night motorists are to a large extent entitled to assume that other persons
will not criminally obstruct the highway by unlighted vehicles
and cause such a great hazard to the ordinary traffic of the
present day.
39. Suire v. Winters, 233 La. 585, 97 So.2d 404, 408 (1957); Vowell v.
Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 229 La. 798, 808-09, 86 So.2d 909, 913 (1956).
40. Arnold v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 190 So.2d 261 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1966); Woods v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 172 So.2d 100 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied; Edwards v. Trahan, 168 So.2d 365 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964); Graham v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 159 So.2d 333 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied; Mose v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania,
134 So.2d 312 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied; Fontenot v. LaFleur, 124
So.2d 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied.
41. 233 La. 585, 97 So.2d 404 (1957).
42. 229 La. 798, 86 So.2d 909 (1956).
43. The statutory provisions in effect at the time of these decisions are
found in LA. R.S. 32:241 (1950) (no obstructing at night without signal
lights) and LA. R.S. 32:290, 301 (1950) (vehicles operated at night to be
equipped with headlights making discernible a person 200 feet ahead).
44. LA. R.S. § 3379 (1870).
45. La. Acts 1914, No. 240.
46. La. Acts No. 43, § 1 (art. 96); LA. R.S. 14:86 (1950).
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The erosion of the "assured clear distance" rule was accomplished by conscientious judges of our Supreme Court and of
our lower courts who realized that the old rule applied literally
was no longer a practical or a fair regulation of the nighttime
speed of modern drivers of modern cars on modern highways.
The judges faced up to the circumstances that a negligence rule
designed mainly for regulation of forty-mile-an-hour traffic on
gravel roads was not a sound basis for deciding the rights of
drivers and passengers several decades later, under the vastly
changed conditions of later times. They therefore modified the
previous law-rule they had applied, so as to base the standard
of care exacted of the nighttime driver not on a mechanical rule
but instead upon the particular circumstances, the apparent risk,
and the driver's opportunity to deal with it. This, I might add,
is paralleled by similar erosion of the "assured clear distance"
47
rule in many other American jurisdictions.
VI
Before we leave our discussion of the treatment by the
Louisiana courts of the "assured clear distance" rule we should
analyze the relationship of the court decisions to relevant legislation.
The courts were deciding whether either or both vehicle
operators were at fault in a nighttime rear-end collision, in
order to determine pecuniary liability for the damages sustained.
The courts cited provisions of the highway regulatory acts
which prohibited parking at night on the highway without lights
or which required headlights of a certain efficiency for vehicles
operated at night; but in truth the courts were not enforcing
these legislative provisions. Rather, they were performing their
function to allocate civil liability for fault under the entirely
separate and distinct provision of our Civil Code obliging those
who caused damage through "fault" to pay for it.48
The provisions of the highway regulatory acts do not provide that persons who obstruct the highway by parking an unlighted vehicle upon it at night are liable for damages to other
vehicles which ran into the darkened obstacles. 49 Likewise, the
provision that vehicles must be operated on the highway at
47. Prosser, Torts § 37, at 211 (3d ed. 1964).
48. LA. CVL CODE art. 2315 (1870).
49. See, e.g., one of the substantially similar provisions of the successive
statutes, LA. R.S. 32:241 (1950).
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nighttime with headlights of a given visibility does not provide that a driver who fails to observe an object in his path
within the requisite distance of visibility is or is not at fault.50
The only sanction specifically provided for violations of the
motor vehicle regulatory act is a criminal penalty of minor fine
or imprisonment."' Nevertheless, by a process of analogy, the
courts deduced from the highway regulatory acts a standard
of conduct, a law-rule for decision, by which to determine private disputes as to who should pay between those who collide
on the highways at night. We must emphasize, however, that
it was not a legislative rule but rather a court-made rule of law
which was used to decide the question of who should pay for
damages caused by these collisions. No legislative act provided
that a violation should be any indicia of civil liability or have
the effect of barring recovery, although the courts reasonably
concluded that a legislative regulation designed to assure highway safety indicated a standard of conduct required by ordinary
care in usual circumstances.
Thus, quite often statutes are generalizations which the legislature intends for the courts to extend and complete insofar as
they may afford principles for the determination of civil litigation in the different contexts of varying facts and later times.
The highway regulatory acts provide explicit commands to police
agencies to prevent cars parking or driving at night without
adequate lights. The acts do not, however, provide explicit commands to the courts to allocate civil liability for accidents resulting from failure to obey the highway regulations. The legislature
did not, for instance, provide that no one parking on the highway
at night without lights could recover damages for injuries thereby caused; if it had, judicial inquiry as to an obstructor's fault
barring recovery would be barred. However, rather than specifying myriad factual situations in which violation might or
might not be fault for purposes of determining any post-accident
civil liability, the legislature instead left this function to be performed by the courts in their historic duty to particularize legislative generalizations.
Again, in determining the tort liability of the various litigants, the sole legislative standard provided was that he who
caused damage through "fault" should pay for it. By the use of
50. See LA. R.S. 32:290, 301 (1950).
51. Id. 32:57; see former law, id. 32:361-62, and La. Acts 1832, No. 21, § 13.
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this general term "fault," the legislature delegated to the courts
the duty to develop a series of standards for the more particularized and varied type-situations of everyday life and, further,
the function of individualizing these applications to the countless gradations and permutations of event and conduct which can
be expected in a living society which must also inevitably
change with the decades. Emphasizing again, therefore, that
the courts must enforce the explicit command of statutes in
order to accomplish their intended purpose, we must also point
out that quite often the statute does not so much as command
but suggest. The legislative suggestion, moreover, may intentionally invite the courts to fashion the more particularized lawrules used to decide the various type-situations of civil litigation.
It may contemplate that the courts will individualize the application of the legislative standard in accordance with exceptional
unforeseen circumstance and that the courts will harmonize the
application of the statutory principles to accord with the social
and jurisprudential context of the times in which subsequent
litigation may arise.
VII
Is it ever proper for a court to ignore the express words of a
statute seemingly applicable?
Let me reiterate once again, before we embark upon this
sensitive topic, that the courts must acknowledge without reservation the legislature's paramount control of law-making and
policy-decision. Whether the judges personally agree or disagree with legislation, they must enforce it according to its purpose. Under the guise of interpretation, they should not thwart
the legislative aims because they disfavor them. In legal history,
unfortunate instances may be found where by literal mechanical application of precise statutory language hostile judges
thwarted the statutory purpose. 52 But these instances also indicate that legislators, in passing a statute, do not intend to enact
words merely but, more, the principles enclosed in those words.
Holmes has somewhere said that words are the skins of
ideas. It is these ideas which the legislature intends to put into
effect; the words are merely auxiliaries used for that purpose.
Thus, when application of literal wording leads to an absurd or
52. Frank, Words and Music, Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,

47 COLUM. L. REv. 1259 (1947).
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unreasonable result, the literal application has been disregarded
by Louisiana courts, because, in the words of Justice Martin in
an 1840 decision, "even where a law is clear and unambiguous,
the letter may be disregarded with the honest intention of
seeking its spirit.153 We know that this principle of interpretation must be used sparingly. It does illustrate, however, that
the sanctity of legislation does not attach to the word-formula
used but rather to the regulatory principle expressed by those
words. The essential authority of legislation derives not from
the printing of words on paper; it proceeds rather from its
enactment as the will of the people adopted by the people's
legislators chosen for that purpose. In applying legislation, the
courts do so in accord with the legislative purpose and in order
thus to carry out the represented will of the people.
Legislation is enacted to regulate the social and legal environment of a living society. As G6ny points out, to apply it to
unforeseen or substantially changed conditions of other times,
even though the original statutory purpose is no longer served,
is to apply mechanically an abstract formula which no longer
represents the will of the legislature. 54 Thus, our Louisiana Civil
Code provides that "Law is a solemn expression of legislative
will."5r, Although our Code likewise states that "when a law is
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit," 56 the principle thus codified is not, as Planiol notes, intended to require
mechanical application of the rigid word-text of a statute to
situations not foreseen by the legislature, since "the cause of the
law ceasing, the law ceases. ' 57 Further, as earlier noted, our
Civil Code expressly provides that "In all civil matters, where
there is no express law [i.e., no enactment of the legislative will
intended expressly to apply], the judge is bound to proceed and
decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is
made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent."5 8 (Emphasis added.)
53. Ardry v. Ardry, 16 La. 264, 268 (1840).
54. G NY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW

(TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE)
55. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1 (1870).

§§

51-59, 92-108 (1963).

56. Id. art. 13.
57. 1 PLANIOL; CIVIL WAR TREATISE (AN

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY THE Lou-

ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) Nos. 216, 217, 224, 224A (1959). The maxim translated in the text is quoted in Planiol as "Cessante causa legi , cessat lex."
See, e. g., State ex rel. Thompson v. Department of City Civil Service

214 La. 683, 38 So.2d 385 (syllabus 2) (1948).
58. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 21 (1870).
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In essence, then, the words of legislation contain a principle
of regulation intended by the legislators to apply to contemplated
norms of their own and succeeding times. But if there is a substantial change in the social conditions the statute is designed
to regulate, the mechanical adjudication by reference to the
statute's literal wording alone may, under the changed conditions, amount to an irresponsible application of a legal rule
devised neither by legislative intention nor by the deciding court.
Early in my judicial career occurred what to me still is a
dramatic illustration of responsible judicial craftsmanship in
failing to apply the literal wording of a statute when to do so
would accomplish an unjust result never intended by any legislature. In Mooney v. American Automobile Ins. Co.59 the issue
was whether a motorist was contributorily negligent for passing
to the right of another vehicle going in the same direction on a
four-lane highway. The overtaken vehicle veered to its own
right and collided with the plaintiff. The plaintiff was charged
with contributory negligence because the passing provision of
the highway regulatory act then in effect stated that an overtaking vehicle was to pass "to the left" of an overtaken vehicle60
Although under its express wording the statute seemed to
prohibit passing to the right on any state highway, our court
held that the enactment did not apply to four-lane highways
(such as that on which the 1953 accident had occurred), but
only to the two-lane highways in existence at the time the
statutory provision was adopted in 1938. The organ of our court
who recommended the opinion's adoption was Judge Robert Ellis
of the First Circuit, in my opinion a great and imaginative judge.
Judge Ellis pointed out that to apply this 1938 provision forbidding passing on the right to the four- and eight-lane highways
of the Nineteen Fifties could greatly impair the usefulness of
these arteries designed to transport heavy traffic volume quickly
-a slow-moving vehicle in the inside, or left, lane, for instance,
could stop traffic in all other lanes proceeding in the same direction if the slow vehicle slowed and stopped for a left turn. In
the Mooney case, therefore, the passing motorist was held free
of negligence in passing, despite his violation of the literal prohibition of the statute forbidding any passing on the right.
59. 81 So.2d 625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
60. LA. R.S. 32:233A (1950).
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This illustration of judicial discrimination as to whether
or not to apply a statute-by deciding that a statutory rule had
been limited or modified through the changed circumstances of
another day - is not advanced to suggest that all legislation
should be deemed valid for its own decade only, nor that the
courts should ignore the express command of statutory words
just because the social conditions change. Usually, an express
statutory provision is designed to and does regulate not only
present day conditions but also the societal conditions of the
indefinite future, until the legislature itself may repeal it, so
that the courts cannot ignore the statute's express command.
Nevertheless, the Mooney case may illustrate the all-important
principle that the function of the courts is to enforce the legislative purpose, not mechanically to apply printed words because
they are in a statute book. Mooney's limitation of an obsolescent statute's effect to its intended legislative purpose may also
serve to illustrate the function of the courts to adapt both legislative and judge-made law to changing conditions of society, so
that the law-rules may continue to serve their functional purpose. Just as out-of-date cases may be reinterpreted to accord
with a changed social context, so may the word-rule expressed
by an out-of-date statute be reinterpreted and limited so as to
conform to its original functional intent.
VIII
These remarks have touched upon a few of the more obvious aspects of the law-making function of our courts. The specific illustrations from the work of Louisiana state appellate
courts are designed to illustrate that usual and routine performance of this function is a necessary and traditional part of the
judicial duty to decide cases fairly and according to law.
However, our concentration upon the law-making responsibility of the courts does have the demerit of overemphasizing
its importance as a factor which influences our society. In the
first place, clear provisions of statutory law, unquestionably
applied and obeyed, undoubtedly represent the customary form
of governmental direction, without any intervention of the
courts. Likewise, great areas of our social and economic life are
affected by the interpretations and applications of executive
departments and administrative agencies, usually obeyed as
valid regulation without questioning in or by the courts. As
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Cardozo remarked, "unnumbered human beings ... go from
birth to death,... and not once do they appeal to judges to
mark the boundaries between right and wrong."61 In the full
picture of the division of the policy-deciding function among the
organs of government, law-making by the courts plays a small
role indeed.
IX
I will conclude with the realization that a comprehensive
and more rounded discussion of judicial law-making should
include many other aspects of the subject.
I have not discussed, for instance, the inherent institutional
and political limitations to law-making by courts, nor touched
on appropriate standards for the exercise of their undoubted
power to overrule their prior decisions where current needs
greatly outweigh the valued stability of legal precept.a6 I have
not noted the stabilizing influence of doctrine, 68 which generally
64
I
confines judicial law-making to incremental changes only.
have not referred to responsible views suggesting that judicial
self-restraint in law-making is especially appropriate with regard
to issues of pronounced change in public policy that should
preferably be decided by the legislature. 65 Neither have I mentioned the view that the courts should to some extent disguise
exercise of their undoubted law-making so as not to weaken
the popular half-myth that judges only interpret and do not
create law, 66 nor the opposing argument that the law's selfrespect and the democratic ideal demand that there be open
responsibility for the exercise of discretionary power by officials
of the people.6 7
61. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 130 (1921).
62. Id. at 112-14, 146-66; LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); SCHAEFFER, PRECEDENT AND POLICY (1956); Friedmann, Legal
Philisophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 821 (1961).
63. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. Rzv.
463 (1962).
64. Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Inorementalism or Stare Decisis?, 2 L. IN TRANS. Q. 134 (1965).
65. Bennett & Quade, The Court as a Legislator: A Crucial Symptom, 10

ST. Louis U.L.J. 92 (1965); Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 749
(1965); McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of JudicialPolicyMaking, 39 MINN. L. REV. 837 (1955).
66. Mishkin, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62-70 (1965).
67. See, e.g., Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law:Prospective

Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 237 (1965).
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X
A comprehensive discussion of the question should also
include discussion of the practical reasons why the legislature
shares law-making responsibility with the court for the development and reform of law.68 The schedule of a normal legis-

lative session is harried and crowded. The state legislators are
usually part-time public servants, underpaid for the substantial
time they must devote to the governmental and private interests
of their constituents. Most legislative sessions take place within
a period limited in time. Not only must many legislative bills
be considered, but during the same crowded time the legislator
must attend to constituent-errands and to at least some of the
duties of his regular occupation. In Louisiana, for instance, in
the last three regular sessions of 1962, 1964, and 1966, at each
session over 1,500 bills were introduced and well over 500 laws
were enacted 6 9-all during the harried period of 60 days, during
which of necessity the legislative preoccupation must be directed
more to issues of public policy, state taxation, and economic regulation than to minor reforms of private law.
With some understanding of this actual legislative milieu,
the unreality of the charge of judicial usurpation made by critics
of creative court law-making becomes apparent. The legislature
makes little effort to correlate present enactments within the
entire body of the law. For one reason, it has no time to do so.
For another, it fully expects and relies upon the courts to perform their historic mission of synthesizing and harmonizing the
fragments of piecemeal legislation into the mosaic of the general body of the law. The law-making function of the court is
68. Breitel, The Courts and Law Making, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY
1 (Paulsen ed. 1959); Peck, The Role of the Courts and the
Legislature in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963). See also
Friendly, The Gap in Law Making-Judges Who Can't and Legislatures Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963).
69. By letter of March 29, 1967, to the writer (a copy of which is on file
with the Louisiana Law Review), Honorable Wade 0. Martin, Jr., Secretary
of State of Louisiana, furnished the following statistics from the records of
his office concerning the regular legislative sessions of 1962, 1964, and 1966:
AND TOMORROW

Bills Introduced were as follows:
196
1968
House
House
1,278
Senate
306
Senate
Bills enacted were as follows:
1962
549

1964
565

1,251
406

1966
House
Senate
1966
577

1,202
345
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cooperative with the legislature, complementary to its work;
the courts are not in any sense a competitive law-making institution. Understanding the legislative process in its actual environment, it is unrealistic to attribute to legislative inaction any
approval of the multitudinous facets of the law as they exist
prior to judicial decision: the inaction much more often stems
from a lack of time for detail-changing or from the clogging of
the legislative process through pressures requiring priority
attention.
With the consent of the legislatures, the American courts
have always exercised the responsibility to revise and accommodate private law where needed to adjust it to the legal and social
environments of the times. To defer their performance of this
duty on the sole excuse that the legislature alone is charged
with law-change and will do so if dissatisfied with the law as
it is, is an unrealistic excuse for shirking this traditional duty
of the judiciary; it is also an historically unsound view of the
separation of powers. Further, the judicial exercise of this lawrevision responsibility is subject to oversight and review by the
legislature (save perhaps where constitutional questions are concerned). If dissatisfied with any court-made law-change, the
legislature can assert its primacy and can overrule or modify
the judicial decision by statute - and, as studies have illustrated,70 the legislatures have done just that when displeased
with judicial innovations or interpretations in the law.
XI
In a day when there is an outcry against judicial legislation by many sincere elements of our population, as well as by
some irresponsible extremists, it is important for us to recognize
and restate the obvious truth that the courts do possess and
should exercise law-making responsibilities.
By frank recognition that judicial creativity is an essential
component of the process of deciding cases, we may perhaps find
courage to correct the misinformation on the subject of many
of the lay public. Misled by Francis Bacon's half-truth, "Judges
ought to remember that their office is ...to interpret law, and
70. Stempf, Congress4onal Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The
Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965); Comment, DUKu
L.J. 888 (1964).
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not to make law."' 1 and by several generations of oversimplifying high school civics teachers, multitudes of our citizenry have
come to believe that it is somehow improper for judges to admit
to law-innovation, law-choice, or law-revision. Unjust criticism
by the lay public and trust-eroding cynicism may perhaps best
be healed by open recognition that the courts do perform, and
always have, a day-to-day law-adaptation function as a necessary part of their traditional decisional process.
In deference to prevalent if erroneous sentiments, conscientious and sincere judges may question their own law-making
power. Historically, however, the circumscribed law-making
functions normal to the judicial branch have been considered a
supplement to, not an invasion of, the legislature's work. Our
judges must not shirk the hard choice of values sometimes
imposed upon them by their duty to maintain the law's regularity and order and sense by creative revision and adjustment
within the limited area where appropriate. If the courts will not
perform this duty, the legislatures cannot-and the reasoned
development of the law and its ability to serve current needs
must suffer.
71. BACON'S
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